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The defendant in Atkins, by confining its jurisdictional "presence"
to a state that allowed assertion of remedies within only a very short
time was permitted, in effect, to defeat both the right and the remedy
created by the plaintiff's state. A persuasive case could be made, as
Justice Rutledge pointed out in Guaranty, that the diversity clause was
inserted to afford protection against exactly this form of abuse of state
sovereignty. 49
If the result in Atkins was required neither by Erie, nor by the Con-
stitution, nor by congressional mandate, nor even by post-Erie case law,
and if the relevant policy considerations militate against it, then why did
the court of appeals feel constrained to deny plaintiff relief, particularly
when, as the court itself admitted, the "equities" of the case "strongly
favor[ed]" him?" The answer can be found in the confusion prevalent
among the lower federal courts as to the proper scope of the Erie prin-
ciple. Perhaps the injustice done Donald Atkins in the name of this
doctrine will serve as a catalyst for resolution of the conflict. Certainly,
Byrd and Hanna are evidence of growing dissatisfaction with the mecha-
nistic application of "outcome-determination," and it is arguable that they
foreshadow a trend towards dignifying the role of the federal court in
diversity litigation, perhaps even by directly overruling Guaranty and
the brood it has spawned. An appealing solution is that suggested by
Justice Harlan, concurring in Hanna:
To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to
apply a state or a federal rule, whether "substantive" or "procedural,"
is to stay close to basic principles 'by inquiring if the choice of rule
would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human
conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation. 5'
C. FRANK GOLDSMITH, JR.
Wills-Ghosts in North Carolina-The Haunting rrobleni of the
After-Discovered Will
Given a death in North Carolina, a will or intestate administration
will normally follow fairly quickly, enabling all concerned to get their
4°326 U.S. at 118-19.
80401 F.2d at 733-34.
380 U.S. at 475. See H. M. HART & H. WEcHSLER, supra note 40. Cf. Angel
v. Bullington, 150 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1945) (opinion of Dobie, J.), rei'd, 330 U.S.
183 (1947).
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fair'allotment from the estate. In the majority of cases distribution ends
the matter, and there are no further problems. Suppose, however, that
75 years after a proper administration and distribution under the intestacy
laws a distant relative finds what he alleges to be decedent's will and pro-
cedes to probate it? On appeal the question arises: May a will be probated
in North Carolina after such a long period of time has elapsed? The
answer is indisputably, "yes."1 This note will explore whether this result
is desirable and consonant with current North Carolina policy on will
probate.
At common law there was no statute of limitations on the original
probate of a will,' and neither the general statute of limitations8 nor the
registration statutes4 were held applicable to original probate. Today,
however, many states have statutes of limitation on the original probate
of a will that run in length from sixth months8 to five years.' North Caro-
lina, however, continues to follow the common law doctrine.
North Carolina does impose some indirect limits upon probate. A
nuncupative will may not be probated more than six months after being
uttered by the decedent unless it is reduced to writing within ten days
from the date of death. An action to caveat a will must be instituted
within three years or be barred completely.8 Probate of a second will
has been barred in North Carolina by the doctrines of laches and
estoppel.10 It has also been held that one who has or knows of a will
-In re Thompson, 178 N.C. 540, 101 S.E. 107 (1919).'it re Dupree, 163 N.C. 256, 79 S.E. 611 (1913); Boggan v. Somers, 152 N.C.
390, 67 S.E. 965 (1910) ; Steadman v. Steadman, 143 N.C. 345, 55 S.E. 784 (1906).
See also 1 N. WIGGINS, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CARO-
LINA § 112 (1964).
' Ricks v. Wilson, 154 N.C. 282, 70 S.E. 476 (1911); McCormick v. Jernigan,
110 N.C. 406, 14 S.E. 971 (1892).
'Barnhardt v. Morrison, 178 N.C. 563, 101 S.E. 218 (1919); Harris v. Dudley
Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 631, 61 S.E. 604 (1908); Bell v. Couch, 132 N.C. 346, 43
S.E. 911 (1903).
'In re Elliot, 22 Wash. 2d 334, 156 P.2d 427 (1945).
Sims v. Schavey, 234 Ark. 166, 351 S.W.2d 145 (1961). See L. SIMES, MODEL
PROBATE CODE § 83 (1946).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-18.3 (1966). It is arguable that the only purpose of the
time limitation on probate is to insure that the will is accurately set down by
the witnesses. In re Haygood, 101 N.C. 574, 8 S.E. 222 (1888).
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-32 (1966).
'Stelges v. Simmons, 170 N.C. 42, 86 S.E. 801 (1915). See also Hayes v.
Simmons, 136 Okla. 206, 277 P. 213 (1928).
10 Stelges v. Simmons, 170 N.C. 42, 86 S.E. 801 (1915). See also Dowd v.
Dowd, 621 Idaho 631, 115 P.2d 409 (1941); In re Stoball, 211 Miss. 15, 50 So. 2d
635 (1951).
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has a positive duty to probate it," and if he fraudulently suppresses
it, he can be criminally prosecuted.'" The executor has a similar duty to
probate the will,' 3 and if the Clerk of Superior Court knows of the
suppression, he may compel production.'4 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-12 and
§ 31-1515 taken together imply that probate of the will is required,'6
although the statutes do not place a time limit on the requirement.
In North Carolina to probate a second will discovered after the
probate of the first, it is necessary to caveat the first.' The reasoning is
threefold: first, in order for the probate of a will to be conclusive it must
be determined to be the last valid will executed by the decedent. If a
second will may be probated while a first is "still on the books," then
the basic premise has been violated, for there is no more a single set of
directions from the testator. Second, allowing probate of a second will
leads to a multiplicity of actions.'" Finally, the probate judgment has
been likened to the civil judgment, which, when rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, cannot be collaterally attacked.'"
The North Carolina caveat statute2° sets out two basic provisions
regarding time limits on probate: the caveat action must be brought within
three years of the probate of the will or it is finally and conclusively
barred, and persons under certain named disabilities do not fall within
the limitation until the disability is removed.2' Thus, if a will was
probated in North Carolina and ten years later a subsequent will was
found, the second will could not be probated because such probate would
be a collateral atack. Nor could the first will be caveated, as more than
"1Wells v. Odum, 205 N.C. 110, 170 S.E. 145 (1933).1 Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1447 (1966).
"In re Mark's Will, 259 N.C. 326, 130 S.E.2d 673 (1963).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-15 (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-12, -15 (1966).
1 Wells v. Odum, 207 N.C. 226, 176 S.E. 563 (1934).
" Powell v. Watkins, 172 N.C. 244, 90 S.E. 207 (1916); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 31-19 (1966). The North Carolina court views probate of a second will
without caveat of the first as a collateral attack and expressly disapproves of it.
It re Puett, 229 N.C. 8, 47 S.E.2d 488 (1948).
8 After the action to probate the second will would follow an action to deter-
mine which will was valid, followed by a series of actions to quiet title in the
various parcels of land involved. Conzet v. Hibbon, 272 Ill. 508, 112 N.E. 305
(1916).
"Springs v. Springs, 182 N.C. 484, 107 S.E. 839 (1921); contra, Schultz v.
Schultz, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 358 (1853).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-32 (1966).
"Note that coverture is not a disability. In re Witherington, 186 N.C. 152,
119 S.E. 11 (1923).
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three years would have passed before the finding of the will. However,
if there were a one year old child interested in the estate at the time of
the probate of the first will, caveat to the first would be allowed.22 In
contrast to the time limitations put on probate of a second will, the probate
of a will subsequent to an intestacy is subject to almost no limits, 28 as it is
by definition an original probate.24
The detrimental effects of imposing few or no limitations on probate
of a will in this context may be most readily seen by an examination of
the potential liabilities of distributees, who take by intestacy; of devisees
and legatees, 25 who take by will; and of the transferees of the legatees.
In the case of a distributee of real property,20 it is established that if
he has the property he is liable for the return of it to its newly established
owner.2 7 Likewise, a distributee of personal property28 is liable to a subse-
quent and rightful owner for the return of the property in specie if it is
in the former's possession.29
The more difficult case occurs in the situation where the distributee
no longer has the property in specie, but has sold it to someone from
whom the rightful owner may not recover.30 Though not completely clear,
it appears that the new owner may claim the proceeds from the original
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-32 (1966). He would have 23 years from the date of
probate. Probate of the second will would be just as incorrect here as it was in
the former situation.
" There are some limits on probate after an intestacy. See cases and statutes
cited notes 7-16 supra.
2 See cases cited note 2 supra.
2 For the remainder of this note the single term "distributee" will be used to
denote any party taking under a will or an intestate administration.2 Title vests in the heirs at the date of death subject to divestment by later will.
Hargrave v. Gardner, 264 N.C. 117, 141 S.E.2d 36 (1965). Title vests in the de-
visee at the date of probate but relates back to the testator's date of death. Steadman
v. Steadman, 143 N.C. 345, 55 S.E. 784 (1906).
"In re Walker's Estate, 160 Cal. 547, 117 P. 510 (1911); Cousens v. Advent
'Church, 93 Me. 292, 45 A. 43 (1899).
8 It is an interesting question as to who has title to personal property if there
is no administration, but only a family settlement. An equally interesting solution
is offered by Brobst v. Brobst, 190 Mich. 63, 155 N.W. 734 (1916), holding that
only the legal title vests in the personal representative, if there is one. The equitable
title vests at death in the distributee. If there is an administration, the distributee
gets both legal and equitable title. If there is no administration, but a family
settlement, the distributee gets no legal title but is estopped to deny the title of
others. See also cases cited note 26 supra. Real and personal property are treated
similarly in this instance.
2 InreWest, 2 Ch. 180 (1909).
20 Rights of a subsequent distributee, legatee, or devisee as against the purchaser
for value will be discussed infra at pages 727-29.
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beneficiary."1 The best authority for this proposition in North Carolina is
Whitehurst v. Hinton,2 where, after a successful caveat of the will ifn-
volved, the referee, and subsequently the trial judge, held that since the
property in question had been sold, the proceeds from the sale could be
followed into the hands of the original devisees. The North Carolina
Supreme Court did not directly decide the issue; however, by affirming
the decision of the trial court, the decision as to the proceeds was affirmed
by implication.-
The original distributee is thus subject to almost strict liability
either for the return of the property in specie or for the return of its
proceeds. Consider the case where a man has inherited property, builds
a substantial home upon it, and then awakens twenty years later to find
himself dispossessed by a devisee under a newly discovered will. Even
though he may recover for the fair market value of the improvements,"
the likelihood of his recovering either the cost or their real value to him
is miniscule. Other similar situations are not hard to imagine. Obviously
an indiscriminate and indefinite statute of limitations on original probate
is not desirable from the standpoint of those who inherited from the
original intestacy or will.
The other individual who can be harmed by the probate of a second
will, or a like action, is the bona fide purchaser 5 from the distributee.
Until 191536 North Carolina did not have a statute protecting the innocent
purchaser, and as a result, in at least two decisions, the bona fide pur-
chaser was held not to be protected. 7 The theory of these cases was
that the title acquired by the subsequent distributee related back3" to the
date of death of the decedent; therefore, the original distributee had
" See Thompson v. Samson, 64 Cal. 330, 30 P. 980 (1883); In re West, 2 Ch.
180 (1909).
"209 N.C. 392, 184 S.E. 66 (1936).
The opinion must be read to be believed. The holding of the referee may be
found at 209 N.C. 392, 399, 184 S.E. 66, 70 (1936) (holding number six) and that
of the trial judge at 209 N.C. 392, 401, 184 S.E. 66, 71 (1936). See also Gray v.
Goddard, 90 Conn. 561, 98 A. 126 (1916); Palmer, Restitution of Distributiols by
a Fiduciary to Which the Recipient Was Not Entitled, 19 HASTINGS L. REV. 993
(1968); Comment, Wills-Executors and Administrators, 36 MIcn. L. REV. 120
(1937).
"The remedial theory is quantum meruit.
"A bona fide purchaser may be defined as "[a] purchaser in good faith for
valuable consideration and without notice." BLAcK's LAW DiCrIONARy 224 (Revw
4th ed. 1968).
"See Bamhardt v. Morrison, 178 N.C. 563, 101 S.E. 218 (1919).
•Id.; Cooley v. Lee, 170 N.C. 18, 86 S.E. 720 (1915).
"Steadman v. Steadman, 143 N.C. 345, 55 S.E. 784 (1906).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
no title to pass. Since the grantee never had title, whether the subsequent
purchasers were bona fide became moot 9 and made alienation of property
a "trap for the unwary."4
Bona fide purchasers are now protected by two North Carolina
statutes.41 Both purport to extend coverage to the purchaser for value
and without notice.42 Both provide that a purchase from a distributee
by an innocent purchaser for value without notice is protected after more
than two years from the date of death of the decedent.4" A purchase is
also protected, even if made within two years, if not challenged until the
period has elapsed.44
It would appear that a two year "wall" is erected by the statutes
between the innocent purchaser and the subsequent distributee. This
result does not necessarily follow, however. For instance, if one buys
property from a distributee of a nonresident decedent, safety from attack
is not guaranteed until five years from the date of death of the decedent.45
In addition, both statutes seem to be directed toward real property only.4"
If a legatee of 100 shares of stock sold the same two years after the
testator's date of death to a bona fide purchaser, who in turn immediately
sold the stock on the market, making it untraceable, will not the bona
fide purchaser be liable to a legatee of the same stock under a subsequent
will? Under the North Carolina statutes it would seem that the pur-
39Id.
Matthews v. Fuller, 209 Md. 42, 120 A.2d 356 (1956).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-83 (1966) [hereinafter cited as section 28-83]; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 31-39 (1966) [hereinafter cited as section 31-39]. The former is con-
cerned with creditors' rights as opposed to those of the bona fide purchaser. The
latter deals with the later probated will and the innocent purchaser.
' Section 28-83 protects the "bona fide purchaser for value and without notice";
section 31-39 protects "innocent purchasers for value," thus seeming to eliminate
the notice requirement.
" Note that section 28-83 also protects a purchase made after the filing of the
final account by the personal representative.
' Section 28-83 and section 31-39.
"Section 28-83 provides in part:
[1]f the decedent was a nonresident, such conveyances shall not be valid
unless made after two years from the grant of letters. But such conveyances
shall be valid, if made five years from the death of a nonresident decedent,
notwithstanding no letters testamentary or letters of administration shall
have been granted.
" Section 28-83 protects "[a]ll conveyances of real property of any decedent
made by any devisee or heir at law.. . ." (emphasis added). Section 31-39 provides
that "the probate and registration of any will shall not affect the rights of innocent
purchasers for value from the heirs at law of the testator . . . ." (This sentence




chaser is liable for the price of the stock at the date of its sale by him
since it is personal, and not real, property involved.4 Finally, suppose a
bona fide purchaser bought real property from a devisee more than
two years after the testator's death but before three years from the death.
A second will was then found and used successfully to caveat the first.
Is a bona fide purchaser from the devisee protected by the statute from
the devisee of the second will? The applicable statute' says that "the
probate and registration of any will shall not affect the rights of innocent
purchasers for value from the heirs at law of the testator . . . ."" The
purchase given in the example was not from the heirs at law, but from
the original devisee; therefore, the'statute ° does not protect the bona fide
purchaser. 1
Since it is clear that in certain situations neither the original dis-
tributee of the property nor the innocent purchaser will be protected, there
should be some strong policy to justify such possibly harsh results. In
the case of the bona fide purchaser, problems are caused not so much by
"'But see 3 AMER IcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.40 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952)
pointing out that most states have protected the innocent purchaser from the taker
by will. Unfortunately, the two North Carolina cases cited by Mr. Casner as
authority for this proposition concern real property. Whitehurst v. Hinton, 209
N.C. 392, 184 S.E. 66 (1936); Newbern v. Leigh, 184 N.C. 166, 113 S.E. 674
(1922). In Cooley v. Lee, 170 N.C. 18, 86 S.E. 720 (1915) and Barnhardt v.
Morrison, 178 N.C. 563, 101 S.E. 218 (1919), both involving real property, fhe
bona fide purchaser was not protected. These cases were overruled by statute which
did not refer to personal property, and presumably the status of the law relating
to personalty is the same as was that of real property in 1915-19.
," Section 31-39.
It Id. (emphasis added). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-2(3) (1966) defines "heir" as
any person entitled to take real or personal property upon intestacy under the pro-
visions of this chapter." This definition is broader than that of the term "heirs at
law" used in section 31-39. The latter term at common law was defined to mean
persons entitled to inheri' real property. In light of this definitional vacuum there
is a grave doubt whether a bona fide purchaser of personal property is extended
coverage under section 31-39.
50 Section 28-83 provides that conveyances by an heir or devisee made within two
years are void as to creditors, executors, administrators, and collectors of the
decedent. If made after two years from the date of death or the filing of the final
account, they are valid, "even as against creditors." Thus as to all parties except
the four named conveyances by an heir or devisee are valid; and those conveyances
made after two years are valid even as against the four classes. If this is a correct
interpretation of the statute, section 28-83 protects a bona fide purchaser from a
devisee of a second will. A better solution would be to amend section 31-39 to cover
this situation.
" It is possible that the bona fide purchaser could be protected by decisional law.
See cases cited note 47 supra. These decisions do not cover personal property,
and also it is arguable that the statute has preempted this area and conclusively
states that only purchases from parties named in the statute will be protected.
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a conclusive state policy limiting protection of the innocent purchaser
as by looseness of statutory language. Much of this could be clarified
by redrafting and possibly combining the two bona fide purchaser statutes.
What seems to be the single justification in North Carolina for the lack
of protection of the original beneficiary is the desire to insure probate
of holographic wills. Because of the sometime secretive nature of the
holographic will, and its penchant for being found in dark comers, an
open statute of limitations for probate seems desirable in order to give the
beneficiaries every chance to find and probate it. The North Carolina
statute controlling holographic wills,"- however, requires that the will must
be found either among the decedent's valuable papers or in some reason-
ably obvious depository. 3 Therefore, it would be the rare case in which a
holographic will is discovered years after the decedent's date of death
and yet qualify under the statute.
5 4
In conflict with the above is a strong North Carolina policy favoring
probate, which has been affirmed in numerous statutes and decisions."
The statement of the court in In re Will of Pendergrass5 is demon-
strative: "It is the policy of the law that wills should be probated,
and that the rights of the parties in cases of dispute should be openly
arrived at according to the orderly process of law."57 Behind the desire
to encourage speedy probate is the even more basic policy of the law
to encourage free and unrestricted alienation of property.58
In balance, it is hardly conceivable that the policy favoring holographic
wills could outweigh a strong policy favoring both speedy probate and
free alienation of property, when the effects on the devisee, legatee, dis-
tributee, and the innocent purchaser are taken into account. At the very
least it is clear that the policy behind the law, or lack of it, has weakened
"2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(3) (1966).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(3) (1966). This section provides that the will
must be
[f]ound after the testator's death among his valuable papers or effects, or in
a safe deposit box or other safe place where it was deposited by him or under
his authority, or in the possession or custody of some person with whom, or
some firm or corporation with which, it was deposited by him or under his
authority for safekeeping.
" What constitutes a "valuable paper"? If the phrase is interpreted broadly, then
a will found almost anywhere could be accepted.
Cases and statutes cited notes 6-14 supra.
"251 N.C. 737, 112 S.E.2d 562 (1960).
"Id. at 742, 112 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting Wells v. Odum, 207 N.C. 226, 228, 176
S.E. 563, 564 (1934)).
" Simpson v. Cornish, 196 Wis. 125, 154, 218 N.W. 193, 204 (1928).
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considerably over the years. Moreover, the problem can be readily cured
by adopting a statute of limitations on probate59 and by strengthening the
bona fide purchaser statutes. Given these factors it would seem an appro-
priate time for the legislature to heed the Latin maxim Cessante Ratione
Legis, Cessat Et Ipsa Lex.60
H. IRwiN COFFIELD, III
"Why should the legislature not adopt the five year statute contained in the
MODEL PROBATE CODE? See L. SIMEs, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 83 (1946)." BLAcK's LAw DIrIONARY 288 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). ("The reason of the law
ceasing, the law itself also ceases.")

